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TAXATION OF MUNICIPAL BOND INTEREST - "INTERESTING
SPECULATION" AND ONE STEP FORWARD
Joseph P. Martori* and Harold J. Bliss, Jr.**
I. Introduction
"Municipal bonds" is a generic term encompassing the bonds issued by
states, territories, possessions of the United States, municipalities and political
subdivisions, and by instrumentalities and agencies of the foregoing.' Although
the term may be misleading to the extent that states, territories and possessions
of the United States can hardly be classified as "municipalities," the scope of
the term is not misunderstood in the investment community or among those
connected with it. Thus, except where otherwise noted, throughout this article
the term "municipal" will be used in this generic sense.
Municipal bonds may be further categorized in accordance with the precise nature of the issuing municipality's obligation to repay its debt. Investment
significance attaches to the distinction between "general obligation bonds," for
which the full faith, credit and taxing power of the issuer are pledged, and
"limited obligation bonds," the debt service of which is dependent upon the
revenues from a specific project or the proceeds of special assessments. 2 The
quality of these bonds is a function of the economic character of the issuer, "its
wealth and income, and the financial competence of its adpopulation, its
3
ministration."

Indisputably, the most important characteristic of municipal bonds is the
exemption afforded the interest thereon from federal taxation. As federal income tax rates have risen, the significance of this feature has increased accordingly. Furthermore, the exemption from federal income taxes is generally
coupled with a similar exemption from state taxation in the state where the
issuer is located.4
Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred
to as the Code) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) General rule.
Gross income does not include interest on (1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the

* Member, District of Columbia Bar, State Bar of Arizona; B.S., New York University,
1963; LL.B., Notre Dame Law School, 1967; M.B.A., New York University, 1968; associate,
Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. Martori was Executive Editor of Volume 42 of
the Lawyer.
Member, State Bar of Arizona; A.B., LaSalle College, 1964; LL.B., Notre Dame Law
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1 FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 (G. Calvert ed. 1963).
2 FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 11.26 (4th ed. J. Bogen ed. 1964).
3 Id.
4 G. Calvert, supra note 1, at 2.
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United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or
of the District of Columbia .... 5

This statutory exemption, which has been a part of the tax laws since the
adoption of the federal income tax in 1913,8 is believed by some to be bolstered
by the constitutional doctrine of "reciprocal" or "intergovernmental" immunity.'
Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Indian
Motorcycle Co. v.United States,' expressed that doctrine in these terms:
It is an established principle of our constitutional system of dual government that the instrumentalities, means and operations whereby the
United States exercises its governmental powers are exempt from taxation
by the States, and that the instrumentalities, means and operations whereby
the States exert the governmental powers belonging to them are equally
exempt from taxation by the United States. This principle is implied from
the independence of the national and state governments within their respective spheres and from the provisions of the Constitution which look
to the maintenance of the dual system. 9
The very existence of the statutory exemption has virtually precluded any
meaningful judicial consideration of the constitutional question.' "And while
the constitutional doubt remains, it is difficult to get the statute changed.""
II. Intergovernmental Immunity as a Constitutional Question
A. Development of the Doctrine
The genesis of the reciprocal immunity doctrine and, consequently, the
alleged constitutional prohibition against the federal taxation of the interest on
municipal securities is the celebrated opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland.2 There the state of Maryland levied a tax on bank
notes of the Second Bank of the United States. In holding such levy invalid on
the ground that the Bank was an instrumentality of the federal government, the
Court stated:
We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from interfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one government to
pull down, what there is an acknowledged right in another to build up;
from the incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy, what
there is a right in another to preserve.
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to
destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 103.
6 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 168.
7 G. Calvert, supra note 1, at 141.
8 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
9 Id. at 575.
10 Lowndes, Current Constitutional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 VAND. L. REV. 469,
481 (1951).
11 E. GRISWOLD, FEDERAL TAXATION 125 (1966).
12 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
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plain repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control,
are propositions not to be denied. 13
It is somewhat curious that McCulloch, a case dealing with an attempted
state infringement of national sovereignty, should give rise to an implied limitation upon the power of the national government vis-il-vis the states. In the course
of his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall elaborated the distinction between the
power of a state to tax national instrumentalities and that of the federal government to tax state functions. 4 Over a century later, this same distinction was
reiterated by Mr. Justice Stone when he wrote:
He [Chief Justice Marshall] was careful to point out not only that the
taxing power of the national government is supreme, by reason of the
constitutional grant, but that in laying a federal tax on state instrumentalities the people of the states, acting through their representatives, are
laying a tax on their own institutions and consequently are subject to
political restraints which can be counted on to prevent abuse. State taxation of national instrumentalities is subject to no such restraint, for the
people outside the state have no representatives who participate in the
legislation; and in a real sense, as to them, the taxation is without representation. The exercise of the national taxing power is thus subject to a
safeguard which does not operate when a state undertakes to tax a national
instrumentality.' 5
Nonetheless, Collector v. Day," in holding that the salary of a state probate
judge was immune from federal income taxation, construed the McCulloch
decision to warrant an implied restriction upon the federal taxing power. The
implied constitutional restriction was found to exist to the extent that a public
official was being compensated for the exercise of functions essential to the
13 Id. at 210.
14 The Chief Justice had little difficulty articulating his position with respect to the
taxation of national and state banks. Presumably, for the purpose of his argument, he considered state banks as much instrumentalities of their respective governments as he considered the national bank to be an instrumentality of the federal government. He stated:
It has also been insisted, that, as the power of taxation in the general and
state governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, every argument which would
sustain the right of the general government to tax banks chartered by the states,
will equally sustain the right of the states to tax banks chartered by the general
government. But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all the
states have created the general government, and have conferred upon it the general
power of taxation. The people of all the states, and the states themselves, are
represented in congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When
they tax the chartered institutions of the states, they tax their constituents; and
these taxes must be uniform. But when a state taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures
of a government created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others
in common with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and always
must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part
on the whole-between the laws of a government declared to be supreme, and
those of a government which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.
Id. at 212-13.
15 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938).

16 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
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maintenance of state governments as they were organized at the time the Constitution was adopted:
[T]he exemption rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the
great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose means employed
in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct government, can exist only at the mercy of that government. Of what
avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion? 7
More specifically, the Revenue Act of 1894, which attempted to impose
an income tax on the interest from municipal bonds, was declared unconstitutional in the landmark Supreme Court decision of Pollock v. Farmers'Loan
& Trust Company." The Court found no distinction between a tax on the income from such bonds and a tax on the bonds themselves; 2" hence, the tax was
held violative of the implied constitutional immunity. Pollock, although somewhat attenuated by later decisions, has never been specifically overruled.
Another ground for Pollock's invalidation of the Revenue Act of 1894
was that it imposed a direct tax on the income from real estate and personal
property without apportionment. 2 It was in response to this latter holding that
popular sentiment in many sections of the United States called for a constitutional amendment to eliminate the requirement of apportionment. This resulted
in the passage of the sixteenth amendment which, when submitted to Congress,
read as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
Prior to ratification there was concern that, as proposed, the amendment
would be construed as abolishing the intergovernmental immunity rule. Such
a fear was voiced by Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of New York. In
a message to his state's legislature, which was in the process of considering
ratification or rejection, Governor Hughes stated that:
[T]he power to tax incomes should not be granted in such terms as to
subject to federal taxation the incomes derived from bonds issued by the
State itself or those issued by municipal governments organized under the
State's authority. To place the borrowing capacity of the State and of its
governmental agencies at the mercy of the federal taxing power would be
an impairment of the essential rights of the State, which, as its officers,
we are bound to defend.2"
The apprehensions of Governor Hughes and others were assuaged by Senator
Borah of Idaho who remarked:
17 Id. at 127.
18 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553-54.
19 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
20 157 U.S. at 584-86.
21 This, of course, was in violation of the constitutional provision for apportionment of
direct taxes. U.S. CO ST. art. I, § 2.
Curiously, eighteen years later Mr.
22 Reproduced at 45 CONG. RFe. 2245 (1910).
Hughes filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of certain insurance companies asserting the
validity of an indirect tax on the interest from municipal bonds. National Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
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To construe the proposed amendment so as to enable us to tax the instrumentalities of the State would do violence to the rules laid down by the
Supreme Court for a hundred years, wrench the whole Constitution from
its harmonious proportions and destroy the object and purpose for which
the whole instrument was framed.23
Further assurances were forthcoming from Senator Root of New York who
declared that "[u]nder [the Constitution] we are forbidden to apply the words
'from whatever source derived' in the proposed amendment to any of the inFormal ratification of the sixteenth
strumentalities of state government."2
amendment as proposed occurred on February 25, 1913.
It is arguable, then, that in light of the legislative history surrounding the
origin and ratification of the sixteenth amendment, the predecessor 25 to section
103 (a) (1) of the 1954 Code, enacted in 1913, "constituted an acknowledgment
by Congress of the inherent right of the States to this immunity."2' 6
Consonant with the above interpretation, in 1928 the Supreme Court
affirmed the immunity of interest on municipal bonds from federal taxation
in National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 7 declaring: "It is settled
doctrine that directly to tax the income from securities amounts to taxation of
the securities themselves . . . . [and] the United States may not tax state or
municipal obligations.""3 That case did not involve the direct taxation of interest from municipal securities, but dealt with the method in which a special
excise tax measured by the net income of life insurance companies was to be
computed. Among the deductions allowed to arrive at net income were (1)
interest received from tax-exempt bonds and (2) such amount, if any, required
to be added to the income from tax-exempt bonds to equal four percent of the
mean required reserve funds.29 Consequently, a deduction was allowed for
tax-exempt interest, and a deduction was allowed for four percent of required
reserves, with the proviso that the amount of the former deduction must be
subtracted from the latter. The result was that the federal tax on life insurance
companies was the same whether the company held tax-exempt securities or
not.30 Thus, life insurance companies derived no tax benefit from holding the
tax exempts. Dissenting from the majority's conclusion, Justice Brandeis, joined
by Justices Holmes and Stone, considered the question foreclosed by a line of
cases that upheld the inclusion of certain tax-exempt items in the computation
of net income."

23 45 CoNo. REc. 1698 (1910).
24 Id. at 2540. That is a rather marvelous declaration.
25 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 168.
26

Hearings on Revision of the Federal Income Tax Laws Before the House Comm. on

Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 741 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
27 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
28 Id. at 521.
29 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 213, 245, 42 Stat. 227.
30 This would have been true at least to the extent that the income from such securities
did not exceed four percent of the mean of the reserves required to be maintained by law.
31 277 U.S. at 527 (dissenting opinion). Included were: Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920) (receipts from interstate commerce included in
state tax); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920)

(same); United States Glue Co. v.
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Indicative of the continued vitality of the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity was Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States." That case invalidated a federal tax on the sale of certain items, including motorcycles, im-

posed upon the manufacturer, producer or importer thereof, where the sale was
made to a municipal corporation for use in its police service. The Court's
opinion does not indicate whether the tax was required to be absorbed by the
manufacturer, producer or importer on whom it was imposed, or whether it
could be or was required to be passed on to the purchaser." Previously, in
Panhandle Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 4 the Court had struck
down a state excise tax on the sale of gasoline, collected only from the dealer,
as applied to sales made to the United States for use by the Coast Guard and a
veterans' hospital. The majority in Indian Motorcycle placed its chief reliance
on Panhandle Oil, and Justice Holmes regarded that case "as controlling in
principle and upon that ground acquiesce[d] in this decision."'" Continuing
to oppose any enlargement of whatever immunity might exist, Justice Stone,
accompanied by Justice Brandeis, dissented.' 6
B. Decline of the Doctrine
Beginning in 1937, the view of the dissenters on the issue of intergovemmental tax immunity began to command a majority of the Court. The resulting
decisions have led to a narrowing of the doctrine with the result that many
authorities have concluded that the exemption is not a constitutional mandate."
Specifically, the combined effect of Helvering v. Gerhardt" and Graves v. New

Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326 (1918) (same); William B. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S.
165, 175 (1918) (receipts from exports); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 147-52
(1911) (tax-exempt securities included in measure of corporate franchise tax). Brandeis's
view that the treatment of life insurance companies under the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
42 Stat. 227, did not constitute unconstitutional taxation is disputed in Powell, The Remnant
of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARv. L. Rav. 757, 797 n.100 (1945).
32 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
33 Id. at 573.
34 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (Holmes, McReynolds, Stone and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
Whether Panhandle Oil has survived the decisions in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S.
1 (1941), and Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941), is discussed in Powell, The
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REv. 633, 657-59 (1945).
35 Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 579 (1931) (acquiescing
opinion). Acquiescence would seem to be somewhat less enthusiastic than concurrence.
36
The implied immunity of one government, either national or state, from taxation
by the other should not be enlarged. Immunity of one necessarily involves curtailment of the other's sovereign power to tax. The practical effect of enlargement is
commonly to relieve individuals from a tax, at the expense of the government
imposing it, without substantial benefit to the government for whose theoretical
advantage the immunity is invoked.
This is especially the case where, as here, the sole ground of the immunity is
that, although the tax is an excise collected by one government from an individual
normally subject to it, the incidence of the tax may conceivably be shifted to the
other government. Id. at 580 (dissenting opinion).
37 E.g., Hearings 682; Gardner, Tax Immune Bonds, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1200 (1940);
Gelfand, Tax Exempt Securities and the Doctrine of Reciprocal Immunity, 32 TEMp. L.Q.
173 (1959); Ratchford, Revenue Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 40 (1954).
Contra, Hearings 784-89.
38 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
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York ex rel. O'Keefe"9 has cast doubt upon the viability of Pollock and its
progeny.
In Gerhardt the Court held that salaries of employees of the Port of New
York Authority, an instrumentality of the states of New York and New Jersey,
were not immune from the taxing power of the federal government. Although
Justice Stone's majority opinion was broLdly written, the holding of the Court
was confined: "[W]e decide only that the present tax neither precludes nor
threatens unreasonably to obstruct any function essential to the continued existence of the state government."" It was in this opinion that Justice Stone
repeated the difference between the basis for the federal immunity from state
taxation and the claimed state immunity from federal taxation which Chief
Justice Marshall had explained in McCulloch.4
The keystone in the edifice of state immunity was Collector v. Day,' which
had invalidated a federal tax as applied to the income of state judges. While
not administering the fatal blow to that case, Justice Stone so emaciated the
decision that it was easy prey for a quick death one year later."3
The question [Day] presented to the Court was not one of interference with
a granted power in a field in which the federal government is supreme,
but a limitation by implication upon the granted federal power to tax.
In recognizing that implication for the first time, the Court was concerned
with the continued existence of the states as governmental entities, and
their preservation from destruction by the national taxing power. The
immunity which it implied was sustained only because it was one deemed
necessary to protect the states from destruction by the federal taxation of those governmental functions which they were exercising
when the Constitution was adopted and which were essential to their
continued existence. 44
Continuing the view enunciated in his earlier dissenting opinions, Justice Stone
further declared: "When enlargement proceeds beyond the necessity of protecting the state, the burden of the immunity is thrown upon the national government with benefit only to a privileged class of taxpayers." '45 The Court
reasoned that although the tax deprived-the states of the advantage of paying
less than the standard rate for services engaged, none of the functions essential
to their continued existence as states were curtailed." Although the effect on
municipalities in terms of increased operating costs would be more ascertainable
if their bond interest were no longer tax-exempt, the authors submit that it is
conceptually difficult to distinguish such an effect from the consequences of
Gerhardt on the states of New Jersey and New York.
39
40
41
42
43
44

306 U.S. 466 (1939).
304 U.S. at 424.
Id. at 412. See also id.at 411 n.1.
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414 (1938).

45 Id. at 416.

46 Id. at 420. Furthermore, the fact that the economic burden of the taxes might be
passed on to the states, thereby increasing to some unknown extent their operating expense,
"infringes no constitutional immunity." Id. at 422.
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Concurring in Gerhardt,Justice Black expressed a desire for a re-examination of Collector v. Day, adding: "[a] citizen who receives his income from a
State, owes the same obligation to the United States as other citizens who draw
their salaries from private sources or the United States and pay Federal income
taxes."'" The re-examination came a year later when the Supreme Court decided Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,"8 which held that the salary of a
federal employee was subject to state income taxation. Justice Stone razed a
pillar of the immunity argument of the state when he declared: "The theory,
which once won a qualified approval, that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable.... " s In so holding, the
Court specifically overruled Collector v. Day."
The demise of Collector v. Day, a decision of considerable importance to
the holding in Pollock, coupled with the disavowal of the theory that a tax on
income is the equivalent of a tax on its source and with the significant narrowing
of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from taxation, suggests that there
is little left to support the exemption of interest on constitutional grounds." The
breadth of the sixteenth amendment certainly is ample enough to justify the
taxation of municipal bond interest.
It could, however, be argued that in Gerhardt and O'Keefe the burden
placed on the government in question by the imposition of the tax was speculative and problematical, and that in the absence of a proven burden the tax
was valid. Since taxation of the interest on municipal bonds would dearly
require higher yields to investors to compensate for their loss of the exemption
feature, thereby establishing a real burden on the borrowing power of the states,
the proponents of tax exemption might, with some merit, find continued refuge
in the Constitution. But this argument appears to have been put to rest by the
Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. King & Boozer.52 The state of Alabama had imposed a sales tax that it attempted to levy on sales to a contractor
of materials purchased for use in performing a cost-plus contract with the federal
government. Although the economic burden of the tax was undeniably upon the
federal government, the tax was upheld. The added burden to the government
was "but a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
independent taxing sovereignties." 5
Neither government contractor qua contractor nor government lender qua
lender has been constitutionally granted a specific tax immunity. Although

47 Id. at 425 (concurring opinion).
48 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
49 Id. at 480.
50 Id. at 486.
51 Cf. Powell, supra note 31, at 795. In James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S.
134 (1937), the Court sustained a West Virginia tax upon the gross receipts of a contractor
derived from building locks and dams for the federal government. Just as contract income
is taxable whether the other contracting party is General Motors or New York City, so
should interest income be taxable whether the obligor is General Motors or the City of New
York.
52 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
53 Id. at 9.
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addressed to contractors, the Court's statement in King & Boozer is equally valid
when addressed to lenders:
The asserted right of the one [Government] to be free of taxation by the
other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable
to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who
have been granted no tax immunity."
The above analysis has caused one observer to conclude:
Thus, even conceding (as one must) that upon the withdrawal of the
exemption the interest to be paid by States and local governments would
have to be increased to meet the interest costs of other borrowers who are
accorded no exemption, this nondiscriminatory burden is "but a normal
incident" of the Federal system and constitutes no ground for granting
tax exemption to the private citizens who lend money to the States and
their subdivisions. 55
Notwithstanding the probable lack of constitutional justification for the
tax immunity afforded municipal bond interest, as long as section 103(a) (1)
of the Code remains, the question is academic. It is clearly within the power
of Congress to determine matters of inclusion, exclusion and deduction for federal revenue purposes, barring, of course, constitutionally protected items. Hence,
the statute's existence has precluded constitutional consideration; yet conversely,
as long as there is no definitive resolution of the constitutional question, the
statute will probably remain unchanged. 6
The closest the Supreme Court has come to reviewing the intergovemmental immunity doctrine in recent years is First Agricultural National Bank v.
State Tax Commission." There the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
had held a national bank subject to the state's sales and use taxes.", In addition
to real property, federal statutory law prescribes four areas in which the states
may tax national banks. 9 There is no reference, either prohibitory or permissive
in nature, regarding sales and use taxes, and absent explicit guidance the state
54 Id.
55 Hearings683.
56 This does not, of course, include the recent amendment to section 103, Revenue and
Expenditure Control Act of 1968 § 107, 82 Stat. 251 (U.S. CONG. NEws, No. 6, July 1,
1968), excluding industrial development bonds from subsection '(a) (1). See note 117 infra.
57 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
58 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1967),
commented on in 43 NoRnc DAm. LAWYER 446 (1968). A similar result was subsequently
achieved in New York. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235
N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. June 18,
1968) (No. 1513, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 175, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S.
July 2, 1968)), noted in 81 HIv. L. REv. 1576 (1968).
59 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964),
which provides, in pertinent part, that:
The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national
banking associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said
shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an
owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4)
according to or measured by their net income [subject to certain conditions which
the statute then imposes] ....
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court had ruled that there was no exemption from such taxes.6" However,
Justice Black for the Court chose to follow the view propounded in Owensboro
National Bank v. Owensboro61 (and subsequently followed in other cases62 )
that the applicable statute marked the outer limits of state power to tax national banks.6" Indeed the more recent decisions64 against implied immunity had
virtually necessitated reliance upon the statute. Following the legal incidence
test to determine on whom the burden falls, Justice Black concluded that since
the tax must be passed on to the purchaser under the requirements of the
Massachusetts statute, 65 the legal incidence was on the national bank. 6 Consequently, the Court was able to hold that since the legal incidence of the tax
was on the national bank and since Congress did not include sales and use taxes
among those that the state could assess upon national banks, the federal statute
prohibited the application of the Massachusetts tax.67
In a dissent joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, Justice Marshall rejected
the view that the statute prescribed the limits of state taxation of national banks,
and confronted the question whether national banks are today entitled to the
constitutional immunity afforded them in McCulloch. As had the Massachusetts court" and the New York court, 69 he concluded they were not."0 Justice
Harlan's dissent, aside from seconding that of Justice Marshall, merely incorporated the relevant portions of the Massachusetts court's opinion."'
In light of the treatment given the issue of the immune status of national
banks under a questionable statute in First Agricultural Bank, it appears quite
clear that the Supreme Court would not reach the intergovernmental tax immunity question where municipal bond interest is concerned as long as the
Code provides an exemption.
III. Scope of the Statutory Exemption
Section 103 (a) (1) has not given rise to the plethora of regulations, rulings
and cases found under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code. The

60 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 N.E.2d 245, 260 (Mass.
1967); accord, Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101,
288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. June 18, 1968) (No.
1513, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 175, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S. July 2, 1968)).
61 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899).
62 E.g., Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 107 (1923); Bank of
California v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 476, 483 (1919).
63 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 343-46 (1968).
64 Including Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), where Justice
Stone declared: "Silence of Congress implies immunity no more than does the silence of the
Constitution." Id. at 480.
65 MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 64H, § 3 (Supp. 1967).
66 392 U.S. at 346-48.
67 Id.
68 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1967).
69 Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. June 18, 1968) (No. 1513,
1967 Term; renumbered No. 175, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S. July 2, 1968)).
70 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 349-59 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
71 Id. at 363 (dissenting opinion).
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language of the statute is reasonably self-explanatory, and the Regulation furnishes additional amplification:
Obligations issued by or on behalf of the State, Territory, or possession
of the United States, or a duly organized political subdivision acting by
constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations, are the obligations of a State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or a
political subdivision thereof. Certificates issued by a political subdivision
for public improvements (such as sewers, sidewalks, streets, etc.) which are
evidence of special assessments against specific property, which assessments
become a lien against such property and which the political subdivision is
required to enforce, are, for purposes of this section, obligations of the
political subdivision even though the obligations are to be satisfied out
of special funds and not out of general funds or taxes. The term "political
subdivision", for purposes of this section, denotes any division of the State,
Territory, or possession of the United States which is a municipal corporation, or to which has been delegated the right to exercise part of the
sovereign power of the State, Territory, or possession of the United States. 72
(Emphasis added.)
The breadth of the term "political subdivision" is evident in Commissioner
v. Shamberg's Estate," where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that interest on bonds of the Port of New York Authority
was not taxable because the issuer was a "political subdivision" within the
meaning of the statute.74 Similarly, the same court held that the Triborough
Bridge Authority was, in effect, an instrumentality of the City of New York
for tax exemption purposes. 5
Where municipal securities are issued at a discount, the "original issue"
discount is treated as tax-exempt interest, in the case of original purchasers,
either upon sale prior to maturity or at maturity. 6 But profits, not including the
original issue discount, that are realized upon the sale of municipal securities
are fully taxable."
It is noteworthy that the exemption provided by section 103 (a) (1) is not
limited to interest on obligations that are evidenced by some particular form of
instrument. An ordinary agreement of purchase and sale has been held sufficient
to fall within the ambit of the statute."'
IV. Industrial Development Bonds: The Jig's Up!
ON DECEMBER 6, THIS MAN SIGNED A BILL INTO LAW THAT
COULD LET YOU PUT UP A MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR PLANT
IN MASSACHUSETTS WITHOUT PUTTING UP YOUR COM72 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1956).
73 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
74 144 F.2d at 1004.
75 -Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 792 (1945).
76

I.T. 2629, XI-1 Cum. BULL. 20 (1932).

77 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
78 Kings County Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 559 (1937).
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PANY'S MONEY. The man is Governor John A. Volpe of Massachusetts. The bill he signed into law - passed with active bi-partisan support
by the state legislature - is called the Massachusetts Industrial Development Financing Act. And what it will do is build you the kind of plant
you want in Massachusetts, without spending any of your company's
money. The program works through the sale of municipal bonds. As
a result of this bill, bonds to provide the capital for building and equipment can now be issued by the community where you want to locate. At
the lowest possible interest rate. Good deal? Sure, it is! Especially with
the sites in Massachusetts. The quality work force. The schools, technicians,
executive talent. And plenty more. Look into it. Call us collect at .... 7
A. Background
"Industrial development bonds" are municipal bonds, the proceeds of which
are used to finance the acquisition, construction or equipment of industrial
facilities for lease to private firms. The bonds may be either general obligations
of the issuer or obligations payable solely out of revenues realized upon the lease of
the project to private industry. The latter type, falling within the category of "revenue bonds," is the more prevalent."0 With the recent addition of Massachusetts,81
approximately forty states have statutes authorizing the issuance of industrial
revenue bonds.8 Although the idea of financing private industrial development
through the use of municipal bonds first appeared in Mississippi in 1936,3 it
was not until 1946 that other states joined the "plant pirating"84 bandwagon."
The method of proceeding under industrial development bond statutes and the
incidental incentives offered prospective lessees vary from state to state.8 6
In 1954 the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling declaring the interest
on bonds issued by a municipality to finance construction of municipality-owned
industrial plants for lease to private enterprise exempt from taxation. 7 It was
therein deemed immaterial that the "political subdivision's" repayment obligation was limited to the revenue to be derived from leasing the property erected
with the bond proceeds. 8 In 1957 the Service further extended the concept
when it ruled that the bonds issued by Alabama's Industrial Development Board,
formed pursuant to enabling legislation,89 were to be considered as issued on
behalf of a municipality."
Probably the most significant pronouncement in this area was Revenue

79 This was the text of a full page advertisement appearing in the New York Times.
Immediately below the large bold print was a picture, approximately 7 x 9 inches, of Governor
John Volpe signing the bill into law. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1968, at 65.
80 Nelson, Tax Considerations of Municipal Industrial Incentive Financing, 45 TAXEs
941, 942 (1967).
81 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40D, § 9 (Supp. 1967).
82 Nelson, supra note 80, at 941.
83 Id.
84 Hearings 734.
85 Nelson, supra note 80, at 941.
86 Id. at 942.
87 Rev. Rul. 106, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 28.
88 Id.
89 ALA. CODB tit.
37, § 816 (Supp. 1967).
90 Rev. Rul. 187, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 65.
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Ruling 63-20." This ruling'set forth the requirements for tax exemption with
respect to obligations issued by a nonprofit corporation formed under the general nonprofit corporation law of a state for the purpose of stimulating industrial
development within a political subdivision of that state. It is important to note
that the "hypothetical" issuer in Revenue Ruling 63-20 was not a corporation
formed pursuant to industrial development enabling legislation. The ruling,
framed in terms of a transaction that would not result in tax exemption for the
interest on the issuer's bonds, went on to list five requirements which, if complied with, would result in the bonds being considered issued " 'on behalf of' the
state or a political subdivision thereof for the purposes of section 1.103-1 of
the Income Tax Regulations": 9 2
(1) the corporation must engage in activities which are essentially public
in nature; (2) the corporation must be one which is not organized for
profit (except to the extent of retiring indebtedness); (3) the corporate
income must not inure to any private person; (4) the state or a political
subdivision thereof must have a beneficial interest in the corporation while
the indebtedness remains outstanding and it must obtain full legal title
to the property of the corporation with respect to which the indebtedness
was incurred upon the retirement of such indebtedness; and (5) the corporation must have been approved by the state or a political subdivision
thereof, either of which must also have approved the specific obligations
issued by the corporation. 93
Clearly, Revenue Ruling 63-20 was formalistic in nature; it opened the door to
the expansion of industrial development financing irrespective of the existence
of state enabling legislation. One commentator, speculating that the Treasury
may have been "seeking to hasten the demise of the interest exclusion on industrial revenue obligations," referred to the ruling as "a kind of federal industrial revenue bond legislation. 94 Another, a former Chief Counsel of the
Service, spoke of the developing "truckhole" in federal tax law and found that
aspect of the ruling which extended the exemption to "interest on the obligations of private nonprofit corporations" inconsistent with the Treasury's unwavering opposition to the exemption afforded municipal securities. 5 Shortly
after the latter commentator's views appeared in print, the Service embarked
on a course to restrict the scope of Revenue Ruling 63-20."6
B. Recent Developments
The Treasury has been intermittently seeking to modify or abolish the
municipal exemption in one way or another for approximately fifty years. 7
91

1963-1 Cum. BULL. 24, released on January 11, 1963 as T.I.R. 442.

92

1963-1 Cum. BULL. 24, 25.

93 Id.
94 Nelson, supra note 80, at 944.
95 Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures With Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Developing "Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 224, 228 (1965). For a discussion of the Treasury's
attempts to abolish the municipal exemption, see note 97 infra and accompanying text.
96 Nelson, supra note 80, at 945-47.
97 Hearings 702. A history through 1959 of the various attempts to end the immunity
is related by Lent, The Origin and Survival of Tax-Exempt Securities, 12 NAT'L TAX J.
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301, 304-14 (1959). One way in which the Treasury has recently tried to undermine the
exemption feature of municipal bonds is by construing section 265 of the Code in a manner
which would deny the holders of tax-exempt securities a deduction for interest on their
outstanding indebtedness. Were such a position upheld, the benefits to be derived from tax
exempts would be negated to the extent that the taxpayer is precluded from deducting interest
Section 163 (a) of the Code permits a deduction for "all interest paid or accrued within
the taxable year on indebtedness." To prevent the boon to taxpayers which would result
from the allowance of a section 163 deduction where the "indebtedness" was incurred or
continued to take advantage of section 103(a) (1), section 265 of the Code provides:
No deduction shall be allowed for (2) Interest.- Interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry
obligations . . . the interest on which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by
this subtitle.
Although the legislative history, early rulings (see I.T. 1213, I-I Cum. BULL. 132 (1922))
and cases (see, e.g., R. B. George Mach. 'Co., 26 B.T.A. 594 (1932); Sioux Falls Metal
Culvert Co., 26 B.T.A. 1324 (1932)) confirm the interpretation that section 265(2) applies
only when the purpose for which the indebtedness is incurred or continued is to purchase or
carry tax-exempt securities, two recent decisions, Illinois Terminal Railroad Company v.
United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and Wisconsin Cheeseman, Incorporated v.
United States, 265 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Wis. 1967), at first blush appear to extend the denial
of the interest deduction far beyond the narrow limits of section 265(2). For a critical discussion of both cases, see McCollom, Recent Cases Threaten All Interest Deductions for
Holders of Tax Exempts, 27 J. TAXATION 194 (1967).
The Court of Claims, in Illinois Terminal, denied the interest deduction with respect
to a debt incurred by the railroad to purchase railway assets. The assets for which the indebtedness was incurred were subsequently sold to a municipality for cash and municipal
bonds of the purchaser. The taxpayer argued that the bonds were unrelated to the loan
but the court, agreeing with the Commissioner, held that the indebtedness was "continued"
to "carry" tax-exempt bonds within the purview of section 265 (2) :
What plaintiff seeks to do is to receive tax-free income and at the same time deduct
the interest expense attributable to obtaining that tax-free income. This is the
double benefit prohibited by section 265(2). A business cannot escape taxation of
income by the device of purchasing or carrying tax-exempt securities with borrowed
money not required to carry on its regular functions. 375 F.2d at 1021.
In Wisconsin Chteeseman, the court denied a deduction for the interest paid on shortterm loans by a cheese retailer. The seasonal nature of the taxpayer's business required it to
borrow substantially in the months preceding its peak sales season. Upon the realization of
sales proceeds, the taxpayer liquidated its short-term loans and invested the balance in taxexempt municipals. This pattern was followed annually. The court concluded that, within
the plain meaning of the statute, the taxpayer "incurred" indebtedness to "carry" municipal
obligations.
Both Illinois Terminal and Wisconsin Cheeseman point in the direction of an extended
application of section 265(2). Although the Commissioner may be seeking to remove the
exemption feature of the bonds regardless of whether there is any connection between the
borrowing and the bonds, McCollom, Recent Cases Threaten All Interest Deductions for
Holders of Tax Exempts, 27 J. TAXATION 194 (1967), the cases to date fall short of upholding
this proposition. The opinions in both of the above cited cases speak to "the purpose" for which
the indebtedness was incurred. The court in Wisconsin Cheeseman said, "this purpose was to
make it possible for the plaintiff to carry its municipal securities," 265 F. Supp. at 169; in
Illinois Terminal it was stated, "[the] issue ... is whether the . . . loan . . . was continued for
the purpose of enabling plaintiff to own," 375 F.2d at 1020, the tax-exempt obligations in
question, and held it was continued for such purpose.
There is language in both opinions which justifies a continued inquiry into the purpose
of a taxpayer in incurring or continuing indebtedness. For example, Illinois Terminal states:
It is necessary [for the Commissioner] to establish a sufficiently direct relationship
of the continuance of the debt for the purpose of carrying the tax-exempt bonds.
If the loan was needed to sustain plaintiff's business operation rather than its
ownership of tax-exempt securities, the prohibitory features of section 265(2) will
not apply. 375 F.2d at 1021. (Emphasis added.)
The opinion of the district court in Wisconsin Cheeseman does contain very broad dicta,
which, if adopted by the courts at some later date, would extend the scope of section 265(2)
to its widest possible limits: "Congress did not wish to grant a deduction for interest payments by a taxpayer who holds securities the interest from which is not taxable." 265 F. Supp.
at 171. The Seventh Circuit, however, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower
court in Wisconsin Cheeseman, has apparently chosen to disregard this dicta. It stated that:
"In our view, the taxpayer is not ipso facto deprived of a deduction for interest on indebtedness while holding tax-exempt securities," Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States; 388
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"Proposals for altering the statute or amending the 16th amendment were considered by congressional, committees during at least six different sessions from
' s
1918 to 1951. "9
Apparently the Treasury has recently felt the time ripe for a renewed effort in this direction; the result has been a drying up of the demand for the type
of bonds under attack." The chronology of this latest effort, limited to a denial
of the exemption concerning industrial development bonds, merits discussion because it evidences the interplay and frequent antagonism arising between the
Treasury and Congress in the administration of the revenue laws.
Treasury Information Release 972,1 dated March 6, 1968, announced
that the Treasury was reconsidering its position on the applicability of section
103 of the Code to "so-called industrial development bonds," because "the
debtor, in reality, is the private corporation which will use the facility conF.2d 420, 422 (1968), and went on to endorse the "sufficiently direct relationship" test of
Illinois Terminal. Id.
Additional support for taxpayers subjected to the Commissioner's reliance on section
265(2) may be garnered from a decision rendered by the Tax Court on April 2, 1968, in
John E. Leslie, 50 T.C. No. 2, Dec. 28,897. There the court sustained the contention of a
taxpayer that no part of its indebtedness was incurred or continued to purchase tax-exempt
bonds:
This case presents us with a new test of the scope of section 265(2) which
denies a deduction for interest when indebtedness is incurred or continued to
purchase or carry tax-exempt securities. Here we are asked whether a large business that regularly borrows large sums of money in the conduct of its business is
to be denied some of its interest deduction because it also holds a relatively small
amount of tax-exempt securities.

Nor is paragraph (2) [section 265(2)] to be applied merely because the proceeds
of an indebtedness are used to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities.
In recapitulating these cases, [the cases under section 265(2)] we see that
the courts have applied a purpose test in determining whether indebtedness is
incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities. The finding of
the taxpayer's purpose does not depend solely upon looking into his mind and
learning what he was thinking; although his intentions are relevant, purpose may
be inferred from his conduct and from the circumstances that confronted him.

Thus, there was some relationship between its indebtedness [the taxpayer in the
present case] and its holding in tax-exempts - if it had held no tax-exempts, it
would have had to borrow less. Nevertheless, we think that the circumstances of
this case do not support an inference that indebtedness was incurred to purchase
the tax-exempt holdings. Id. at 2251-55.
The recent cases indicate that the Commissioner is apparently bent upon extending
section 265(2) to a point far beyond that which is justified by the legislative history of the
statute and the prevailing case law. If construed to require an inquiry into the taxpayer's
purpose in incurring or continuing indebtedness, the statute is admittedly difficult to administer. However, difficulty of administration is no excuse for acting in derogation of
congressional intent. Hence, the burden now rests on Congress to amend the statute to
alleviate the hardships besetting the Treasury.
Rule-making by. judicial interpretation has its limits; such rules tend to be confined to
the exigencies of the particular case. Frequently the effect is to confuse rather than to

clarify.
98
99
100

Hearings 741.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1968, at 53, col. 6.
7 CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAX RElP. g 6648.
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structed with the proceeds of the bond issue."'' The release stated that proposed
regulations, the effect of which would be to exclude from the scope of section
103 (a) (1) bonds sold after the regulations went into effect, were to be issued
on or before March 15, 1968. Accordingly, the Service proposed to publish a
revenue ruling revoking Revenue Rulings 54-1061"2 and 57-187..s and appropriately modifying Revenue Ruling 63-20.114 Furthermore, the Service announced that it would cease issuing ruling letters with respect to industrial development bonds.1"5 At least two corporations "rushed to beat the deadline"
established in the above release.0 8 An attempt by the Senate to pressure the
Shortly
Treasury into retracting its proposed action was narrowly defeated.'
thereafter, the Senate Finance Committee attached a rider to the Tax Adjustment Bill of 1968108 that would have continued the exemption for interest on
industrial development bonds until Congress provided otherwise.
A proposed regulation, pursuant to the Treasury's announcement in
Treasury Information Release 972, was to be the subject of hearings scheduled
to begin on May 20, 1968.109 It is quite conceivable that the inclusion of the
101 Id.
102 See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
103 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
104 See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
105 T.I.R. 972, 7 CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAx REP. f 6648.
106 Wall Street Journal, March 12, 1968, at 23, col. 1.
107 Id. at 21, cols. 1-3.
108 H.R. 15414, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
109 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7, 33 Fed. Reg. 4950 (1968). The proposed regulation
in pertinent part reads as follows:
(a) Treatment of industrial development bonds. An industrial development
bond (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section) shall not be considered to be
an obligation of a State, a territory, or a possession of the United States, or any
political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia within
the meaning of section 103(a)(1) and § 1.103-1 (hereinafter referred to as a
"governmental unit").
(b) Definition of industrial development bonds. (1) The term "industrial
development bond" means any indebtedness issued by a governmental unit if under
the terms of such indebtedness or any underlying lease, deferred payment sale, loan
or similar arrangement(i) One or more identifiable persons other than a governmental unit have
the use of, or the right to use, all or a major portion of the proceeds, or property
acquired with the proceeds, of such indebtedness,
(ii) Such person is required to provide all or a major portion of the funds
necessary to pay the principal and interest on such indebtedness, and
(iii) The payment of the principal and interest on such indebtedness is
secured in whole or in major part (a) By a security interest (as defined in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph)
in such property, or
(b) By an interest in (or to be derived from) payments to be made with
respect to such property or to such loan.
Such indebtedness, although issued by a governmental unit, is in reality the indebtedness of a person other than a governmental unit since under the terms of
the indebtedness or any underlying lease, deferred payment sale, loan or similar
arrangement the governmental unit serves as a conduit for disbursing funds provided by such person, and the liability for providing the funds to pay the principal
and interest on the indebtedness is that of such person. Similarly, the status of
such indebtedness of a person other than a governmental unit is not changed by
the agreement of a governmental unit to guarantee the indebtedness of such person.
(2) For purposes of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, the term "security
interest" means any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of
securing payment or performance of an indebtedness.
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provisions of subsection (c) (2) of the proposed regulationi" was an attempt by
the Treasury to quiet or lessen the Senate opposition to this regulation.
The early response to the proposed regulation appeared to sound its death
knell. On March 26th the Senate voted to require the Treasury to continue
indefinitely the exemption of interest on industrial development bonds."i- It
was suggested that this action may have been taken because of Congress's
decision to move on its own." Then two days later, the Senate, after heavy

(3) For purposes of subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph, use of property
by a person other than a governmental unit exists only if, under the lease, deferred

payment sale, loan, or similar arrangement, a major portion of any direct economic
benefit to be derived from property (other than property described in subdivision
(ii) of this subparagraph) may inure to such a person. Thus, a person other
than a governmental unit will not be considered, for purposes of subparagraph (1) (i)
of this paragraph, to have the use of, or the right to use, property if (i) Such property is owned by a governmental unit and such person is operating or managing the property on behalf of a governmental unit and does not
have rights with respect to such property such that a major portion of any direct
economic benefit to be derived from such property may inure to a person other
than a governmental unit, or
(ii) Such property is functionally related to a facility owned by a governmental unit that is or will be operated or managed by or on behalf of the governmental unit, and such property is operated as an integral part of the entire facility.
(4) Examples [13 examples illustrating the provisions of this section are given]
(c) Applicability. (1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2) of
this paragraph, the provisions of this section are applicable to any indebtedness
initially sold (within the meaning of subparagraph (3) of this paragraph) after
March 15, 1968.

(2) The provisions of this section are not applicable to any indebtedness

initially sold (within the meaning of subparagraph (3) of this paragraph) at any
time prior to September 15, 1968, if, on or before March 15, 1968(i) The issuance of such indebtedness was approved by the governing body
of the governmental unit issuing such indebtedness or by the voters of such governmental unit;
(ii) In connection with the issuance of such indebtedness or with the use of
the proceeds to be derived from the sale of such indebtedness or property to be
acquired with such proceeds, the governmental unit issuing such indebtedness has
made a significant financial commitment;
(iii) Any person other than a governmental unit who will use (within the
meaning of paragraph (b) (3) of this section) the proceeds to be derived from the
sale of such indebtedness or the property to be acquired with such proceeds has
expended, or has entered into a binding contract to expend, for purposes which
are related to the use of such proceeds or such property, an amount equal to or
in excess of 20 percent of such proceeds; or
(iv) In the case of an indebtedness issued in conjunction with a project where
financial assistance will be provided by a Federal or State agency concerned with
economic development, such agency has approved the project or an application for
financial assistance is pending.
(3) For purposes of this paragraph, an indebtedness will be considered "initially sold" on the date on which a buyer or underwriter enters into a binding
contract with the issuer for the purchase of such indebtedness at a fixed price.
An agreement between a buyer or underwriter and an issuer will be considered
to be a binding contract for the sale of an indebtedness although the obligations
of one or both parties to such agreement are subject to one or more conditions
which are beyond the control of such party or parties. Thus, for example, if a
sale of bonds to be issued by a county at a fixed price must first be approved by
the voters of the county, such agreement will be considered a binding contract, if
it is otherwise unconditional, and the bonds will be considered initially sold on the
date on which the agreement is executed.
110 Quoted in note 109 supra.
111 114 CONG. REc. S3339 (daily ed. March 26, 1968); Wall Street Journal, March 27,
1968, at 21, col. 1.
112 Wall Street journal, March 27, 1968, at 21, col. 1.
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pressure was brought by organizations opposing the continued growth of taxexempt industrial development bonds,113 reversed its position of March 26th and
voted to revoke the exemption, effective January 1, 1969."" As a result of the
Senate's reversal, when the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968115
was enacted the exemption for industrial development bonds had met its Waterloo." 6 Section 107 of that act provides for the exclusion of industrial development bonds from the coverage of section 103 (a) (1) of the Code." 7 For the

113 Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1968, at 16, cols. 1-2. It is interesting to note that
one of these pressure groups was the National Association of Counties which, "in communications to Senators, declared that continued growth of tax-free industrial bond issues 'poses a
disastrous threat to the entire state and local government bond market.'" Id. The association's demand bolstered the argument of the Treasury that the flooding of the market with
industrial bond issues, designed to aid private business, tended "to increase interest rates local
government must pay on issues financing strictly public projects." Id.
114 114 CONG. Rac. S3562 (daily ed. March 28, 1968); Wall Street Journal, March 29,
1968, at 16, cols. 1-2.
115 82 Stat. 251 (U.S. CONG. NEws, No. 6, July 1, 1968).
116 That the demise was not universally welcomed is shown by the report that Chairman
Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced a bill, hardly before the ink in the
President's signature to the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 was dry, that
would virtually nullify the effect of the industrial development bonds aspect of the legislation. Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1968, at 4, cols. 3-4.
117 Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 § 107, 82 Stat. 251 (U.S. CONG. Naws,
No. 6, July 1, 1968) provides in its entirety:
SEC. 107. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS.
(a) Amendment of Section 103.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain
governmental obligations) is amended by relettering subsection (c) as subsection (d)
and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
"(c) Industrial Development Bonds."(1)
Subsection (a) (1) not to apply.-Except as otherwise provided in
this subsection, any industrial development bond shall be treated as an obligation not described in subsection (a) (1).
"(2)
Industrial development bond.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
'industrial development bond' means any obligation "(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or business
carried on by any person who is not an exempt person (within the meaning
of paragraph (3) ), and
"(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the terms
of such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in whole or in major part"(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade
or business or in payments in respect of such property, or
"(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed
money, used or to be used in a trade or business.
"(3) Exempt person.-For purposes of paragraph (2) (A), the term 'exempt
person' means"(A) a governmental unit, or
"(B) an organization described in section 501(c) (3) and exempt from
tax under section 501 (a) (but only with respect to a trade or business carried
on by such organization which is not an unrelated trade or business, determined
by applying section 513(a) to such organization).
"(4)
Certain exempt activities.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any obligation
which is issued as part of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of which are
to be used to provide"(A) residential real property for family units,
"(B) sports facilities,
"(C) convention or trade show facilities,
"(D) airports, docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities, parking facilities,
or storage or training facilities directly related to any of the foregoing,
"(E) sewage or solid waste disposal facilities or facilities for the local
furnishing of electric energy, gas, or water, or
"(F) air or water pollution control facilities.
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"(5) Industrial parks.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any obligation issued
as part of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of which are to be used for the
acquisition or development of land as the site for an industrial park. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the term 'development of land' includes the provision
of water, sewage, drainage, or similar facilities, or of transportation, power, or communication facilities, which are incidental to use of the site as an industrial park,
but, except with respect to such facilities, does not include the provision of structures
or buildings.
Exemption for certain small issues."(6)
"(A) In general.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any obligation issued
as part of an issue the aggregate authorized face amount of which is $1,000,000
or less and substantially all of the proceeds of which are to be used (i) for
the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or improvement of land or property
of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation, or (ii) to redeem
part or all of a prior issue which was issued for purposes described in clause
(i) or this clause.
Certain prior issues taken into account.-If"(B)
"(i) the proceeds of two or more issues of obligations (whether or
not the issuer of each such issue is the same) are or will be used primarily
with respect to facilities located in the same incorporated municipality
or located in the same county (but not in any incorporated municipality).
"(ii) the principal user of such facilities is or will be the same
person or two or more related persons, and
"(iii) but for this subparagraph, subparagraph (A) would apply
to each such issue,
then, for purposes of subparagraph (A), in determining the aggregate face
amount of any later issue there shall be taken into account the face amount of
obligations issued under all prior such issues and outstanding at the time of
such later issue (not including as outstanding any obligation which is to be
redeemed from the proceeds of the later issue).
"(C) Related persons.-For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph
(7), a person is a related person to another person if"(i) the relationship between such persons would result in a disallowance of losses under section 267 or 707(b), or
"(ii) such persons are members of the same controlled group of
corporations (as defined in section 1563(a), except that 'more than 50
percent' shall be substituted for 'at least 80 percent' each place it appears
therein).
(4), (5), and (6) shall not apply with
"(7)
Exception. -Paragraphs
respect to any obligation for any period during which it is held by a person
who is a substantial user of the facilities or a related person."
(b) Effective Date.(1) In General.-Except as provided by paragraph (2), the amendment
made by subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years ending after April 30,
1968, but only with respect to obligations issued after such date.
(2) Transitional provisions.-Section 103(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended by subsection (a), shall not apply with respect to
any obligation issued before January 1, 1969, if before May 1, 1968(A) the issuance of the obligation (or the project in connection
with which the proceeds of the obligations are to be used) was authorized
or approved by the governing body of the governmental unit issuing the
obligation or by the voters of such governmental unit;
(B) in connection with the issuance of such obligation or with the
use of the proceeds to be derived from the sale of such obligation or the
property to be acquired or improved with such proceeds, a governmental
unit has made a significant financial commitment;
(C) any person (other than a governmental unit) who will use the
proceeds to be derived from the sale of such obligation or the property
to be acquired or improved with such proceeds has expended (or has
entered into a binding contract to expend) for purposes which are related
to the use of such proceeds or property, an amount equal to or in excess
of 20 percent of such proceeds; or
(D) in the case of an obligation issued in conjunction with a project
where financial assistance will be provided by a governmental agency concerned with economic development, such agency has approved the project or
an application for financial assistance is pending. [Footnote omitted.]
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present at least,"' the bell has apparently tolled for industrial development
bonds.
V. The Merits of Excluding Industrial Development Bonds

from Section 103(a)(1)
The tremendous growth of industrial development financing "has long been
attacked by some municipal bond dealers.""' 9 The total dollar value of industrial development issues floated in 1958 was approximately twenty-six million. 2 '
In late February, 1968, when it became apparent that the Treasury was seeking
to move in the direction of ending the exempt status of such bonds, more than
five hundred million dollars of these bonds were "overhanging the market."''
Remedial action rectifying the inequities which result from the applicability
of section 103 (a) (1) of the Code to industrial development bonds was long
overdue. The ostensibly meritorious arguments for maintaining the existing
exemption from taxation afforded municipal bond interest have no application
to industrial development bonds. It is contended by those who champion the
exclusion of municipal bond interest from taxation that the exemption is an
instrument of federalism, i.e., that it promotes our system of dual sovereignties."2
Additionally, the exemption is said to assist the states in providing public facilities
and services.12 ' However, neither contention is valid when applied to industrial
development bonds. The effect of such bonds has been to divide the states by
promoting industrial migration. This, in turn, has resulted in a waste of resources and in other unsettling economic consequences. Furthermore, under the
guise of a governmental activity, private industry has profited at the expense of
the American people.
The application of the exemption to industrial development bonds has
been called "a perversion of the basic purpose of the tax law.""' 4 These bonds
are in reality commercial bonds; the issuing municipality has simply "sold its
income tax exemption privilege to a private corporation.""'
The official statements describing new issues of industrial development
bonds appear similar, if not identical, to preliminary prospectuses covering
taxable corporate bonds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In fact, the industrial development bond statements frequently reveal
little about the towns selling the bonds and much about corporations that
will lease the facilities. Critics of industrial aid bonds have cited this practice as convincing evidence that the underwriters really do not consider
the bonds as tax-exempt municipal securities. 1 6
118 See note 116 supra.
119 N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1968, § F, at 1, col. 8.
120 Hearings 731. For a state-by-state summary of the total amount of industrial aid
financing for the years 1956-1966, see 114 CONG. REc. E2177-78 (daily ed. March 22, 1968).
121 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1968, at 58, col. 6.
122 Hearings 738, 740, 769.
123 Id. at 790-91.
124 Id. at 732.
125

126

Id.

N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1968, § F, at 12, col. 3.
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. The abuse of the tax system in this area is analogous to the experience in
the-late 1950's and early 1960's involving gifts to charitable organizations and
the inequitable tax benefits accruing to certain charitable donors:
[A] lesson learned is that reliance on tax benefit presents seemingly
unavoidable temptations toward promotion.... The greater the tax benefits, the greater becomes the pressure for active promotion.
Advertising the tax-savings also called the attention of the Internal
Revenue Service to the fact that they were in the middle of the whole
picture. The I.R.S. had granted the tax relief, and the adverse reaction
reflected 1as
unfavorably on that agency as it did on the charitable in27
stitutions.
As it did then, the Internal Revenue Service, and even the Congress, has responded to the demand for relief.
There is little doubt about the constitutionality of section 107 of the
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. If the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is at all viable, it certainly has no application to industrial development bonds. To contend that subsidization of private industry
in this fashion is a function that was essential to the maintenance of state governments as they were organized at the time the Constitution was adopted' would
be utter foolishness. Furthermore, it is submitted that the rule-making authority
of the Treasury " alone would have been sufficient to exclude industrial development bonds from section 103 (a) (1); had the Treasury done so, the need for
the recent congressional exclusion would have been obviated.
VI. Effects of Exempting Municipal Bond Interest from Taxation
A. Investors
Municipal securities have always sold at lower yields than taxable bonds of
similar quality and maturity. This yield differential is a function of several
factors:
The differential would widen if progression in the Federal income tax
steepened, or if the level of rates increased, of if the volume of State-local
issues shrank; it would narrow if progression lessened, if the level of rates
decreased, or the volume of State-local issues grew. 30
The value of the tax exemption of municipal bonds to a given individual
is dependent upon his taxable income. An investor in the higher tax brackets
will obtain greater advantages from the purchase of tax-exempt bonds than
will one with a more modest income. This proposition is illustrated by the Table

127

R.

DESmOND, HIGHER EDUCATION

128
129 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 7805.
130

&

TAX MOTIVATED GMNO: THE FEDERAL TAX

OF LIFE INCOME AND ANNUITY GIFTs 56 (1967).
See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).

HISTORY

Hearings 708.
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entitled "Tax-Exempt Bonds and Their Equivalents," set out in Appendix A.
A municipal bond yielding 4.5 percent is the equivalent of a 5.77 percent taxable
yield for a couple with a taxable income of $10,000 who file a joint return.
Yet the same bond would be worth a taxable yield of 11.25 percent to a couple
with a joint taxable income of $100,000. A couple with a total taxable income
of $35,000 and investment income of $3,000 from investments yielding 4.5 percent would fare 70 percent better by investing in municipal bonds of the same
yield. 3'
Bond yields of 4.5 percent are not uncommon today. The Dow-Jones
municipal yield index, which measures the yields of twenty representative state
and city issues in the twenty-year maturity range, has fluctuated from a low
of 4.25 percent to a thirty-four-year high of 4.65 percent in 1968.32 The monthly
average of the Dow-Jones municipal yield index from 1965 to the present is
depicted in Appendix B.
B. Issuing Governments
New issues of tax-exempt municipals have increased nearly 100 percent in
the past ten years.'33 The total dollar value of these bonds outstanding in 1968
exceeds 100 billion dollars." 4
"It is impossible to quantify the economic effects of the exemption of municipal bond interest.""' 5 The exemption feature undoubtedly manifests itself in
the form of reduced borrowing costs to the issuer. However, the extent of the
interest savings is not simply a matter of multiplying the yield differential by
the total value of municipal bonds outstanding, because such computation erroneously presumes that the only distinction between municipals and comparable
industrials is the tax-exempt status of the former. Furthermore, "[d]epending
upon the quality of the bonds used for the comparatives, the spread or differential
in yield will vary.""' 6
One of the chief attributes of bond issues is their lack of homogeneity.
It is difficult enough to compare two issues in the same category, but the
comparison of an industrial and a municipal, for example, is likely to
become farfetched indeed. Bond issues differ in degree of risk, marketand size, to name
ability, maturity, reputation of the
7 issuer for fair dealing,
only five major characteristics.1
It is believed safe to estimate that on the basis of the total municipals outstanding to date and a yield differential ranging between 1 and 2.5 percent,
the reduction in municipal borrowing costs exceeds one billion dollars per annum.

131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1968, at 7.
Id. at 19, col. 2.
See Appendix C, "Annual Municipal Bond Sales: 1951-1968," infra.
Id.
Hearings 724.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 777.
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C.. Federal Government
To the extent of the reduction in borrowing costs, the exemption of municipal bond interest from federal income taxation represents an indirect federal
subsidy to the states and their political subdivisions. The size of the subsidy is
governed by the capital needs of the issuing municipalities, and, for this reason,
it has been termed "a sort of unconditional Federal subsidy.""'
The cost of tax exemption to the Government far exceeds the reduction
in borrowing costs to municipalities. The reason for this "leakage" is that "the
bond buyer purchases the tax exemption at bargain prices." 3 ' That the tax
benefits acquired by a municipal bond buyer manifestly overshadow the yield
he sacrifices by foregoing comparable industrial bonds is evident from the Table
set forth in Appendix A. "Were it not for the progression in our individual surtax
rates, this disturbing effect of the tax exemption would probably not exist.""'
More detrimental to the federal tax structure than the loss of revenue attributable to the exemption feature is its apparent irreconcilability with our
ostensible adherence to the theory of progressive income taxation. This loophole,
a "shocking violation" of the basic principle that "equal incomes should bear
"taxpayer morale in a system which depends
equal tax liabilities," undermines
141
largely on self-assessment."'
VII. Conclusion
This article has sought to view the current status of municipal securities,
with some emphasis upon industrial development bonds. A few additional
comments may be appropriate in summation.
A. Intergovernmental Immunities
It was stated early in this article that there appears to be little left to support
the exemption of interest (section 103 (a) (1) of the Code) on constitutional
grounds. It is, however, recognized that neither Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust

138 Id. at 715.
139 Id. at 687. The bond buyer purchases his bonds at "bargain prices" in the sense that
the bonds are priced below the value of the tax exemption.
The cost to the bond buyer is assumed to be three-fourths of 1 percentage point
in yield, yet the tax benefits which he acquires may be far in excess of that loss of
income to him. For example, a bondholder in a 47-percent bracket who invests
in a municipal bond with a 3',4-percent yield obtains the equivalent of a 6.6percent yield from a taxable bond. And as the taxpayer goes into the higher tax
brackets, the excess benefits from the tax exemption feature multiply rapidly.
In an 81-percent surtax bracket the bondholder obtains a yield equivalent to 18.4
percent on a taxable bond. Similar benefits are obtainable by corporate investors
in tax-exempt bonds; a corporation, taxable at the flat 52-percent rate, obtains the
effect of a 7.3-percent yield through the purchase of a municipal bond with a 3'!,percent yield. Id. at 687-88. [Of course, since these Hearings were held in 1959,
the figures would have to be adjusted to reflect current rates of taxation. However,
the point remains clear.]

140 Id. at 688.
141 Id. at 684.
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Company4 ' nor National Life Insurance Company v. United States" 3 has been
specifically repudiated. Therefore, either opinion could serve as precedent for
a subsequent Supreme Court decision holding that the repeal of section 103 (a)(1) requires a constitutional amendment. But on balance it is believed that
the more recent Court decisions pertaining to reciprocal tax immunities militate
against such future action by the Supreme Court. However,
[U]ntil the statutory immunity of interest from state and municipal bonds,
which prevents a judicial determination of any constitutional immunity,
is repealed, the constitutional immunity seems destined to remain a subject
for interesting speculation. 44

B. Industrial Development Bonds
Stimulated by the recent activity of the Treasury, Congress has abolished
the exemption as far as industrial development bonds are concerned. However,
the new legislation specifically limits the revocation of the tax exemption privilege
to interest on bond issues of more than one million dollars. 45 This concession to
communities seeking to attract small industry, although possibly warranted on
other grounds, is, it is submitted, recidivistic. The fact that an industrial development bond issue is small in size is of no consequence with respect to the
rationale for abolishing the exemption. Furthermore, the concession could conceivably subject the proposed amendment to constitutional attack on the grounds
that it discriminates against larger industry in contravention of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.

C. Repeal of Section 103(a)(1)
The authors feel that the current statutory exemption in section 103 (a) (1)
is inconsistent with a strict application of the theory of progressive income taxation. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has stated: "The federal income tax
cannot be fair and adequate in the application of its progressive rates until this
hole is in some way filled."' 46
Moreover, the repeal of the exemption would not wreak catastrophic
effects upon state and local governments. To the extent that municipal bond
yields increased as a result of the loss of their tax-exempt status, those taxexempt institutions (pension trusts, charitable organizations, etc.) that derive
no benefit from the exemption feature and, consequently, have no incentive to
forego the higher yields of comparable industrials would be attracted to the
municipal securities industry.

142 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
143 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
144 Lowndes, Current Constitutional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 VAND. L. Rnv.
469, 481 (1951) (footnote omitted).
145 Revenue Expenditure and Control Act of 1968 § 107 (a) (6) (A), 82 Stat. 251 (U.S.
CONG. N.ws, No. 6, July 1, 1968), set out in note 117 supra.
146 E. GRiSWOLD, FEDERAL TAXATxoN 125 (1966).
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Finally, the federal government could directly subsidize, if need arose, state
and local borrowing and, in so doing, avoid the "leakage" resulting from the
presently existing indirect subsidy. Numerous proposals and plans have been
submitted in this regard.' 47
The abolition of the exemption privilege as applied to industrial development bonds is a step in the right direction- it may be a prelude of things to
come.

147

Hearings 690-98, 713-14.
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MUNICIPAL BOND YIELDS*

Monthly Average of Twenty 20-Year Bonds
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* Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1968, at 19, coL 3.
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APPENDIX C

Annual Municipal Bond Sale: 1951-1968*
($ billions)

1951 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

* Hearings 743 (for 1951-1958); Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1968, at 7, col. 2

(for 1958-1968).

